In the field of politics and the art of mastering it, there are laws that players must master if they want to succeed in their work and contributions in this field. One of the most important of these laws is the ability to find common ground with the political opponent in the same arena and to deal with the adversary with mutual respect. In any political talks to build a unified political entity, government, struggle front, or opposition alliance, the parties come to the talks with their political programs and phased plans that they believe in and have promised their followers, supporters, and voters. Naturally, each party tries to achieve the greatest accomplishments and leave the imprint of its political program and strategic vision on the details of the agreement... But the experienced successful politician realizes that it is impossible to force the other party to accept only his vision and that the other must give up all ambitions... Complete concession of all political ambitions and visions means political suicide for the conceding party, and no true politician who is honest with himself and his voters would undertake this... The art lies in finding common denominators among all parties' visions so that everyone leaves the talks with an agreement that preserves everyone's dignity and places all in a winning position...
Unfortunately, this dialectic conflicts with the Eastern Arab mentality based on total gain and total loss, which in my opinion is one of the obstacles to transitioning to modernity in the Arab mind... In the field of Arab partisan and movement politics, generations of cadres and members are raised to believe that success only comes through the complete abortion of the political opponent, while in societies that respect pluralism, political work and education are based on the principle: today's opponent can become tomorrow's ally... Politicians in these societies do everything possible to avoid severing ties, knowing that the world of politics is circular, not a straight line! A quick look at the alliances in the occupation state shows the pragmatism of the political elite there, which in my opinion is one of the main reasons for their success and superiority.
In the Palestinian case, after beginning rapid and optimistic steps toward ending the division to reach full national, political, and social reconciliation, we now stand at a crossroads... The easiest options are difficult... The only compass that should govern choosing one option or another is the supreme national interest, and all political parties must exercise responsibility and national duty to overcome this disaster and face the difficult stage in all its aspects.
In a previous article on reconciliation, I pointed out the risks lurking on the path to ending the division and wrote that the parties harmed by the Palestinian reconciliation would not stand idly by and would do everything in their power to sabotage this attempt to save the Palestinian cause from extinction... Attempts to sabotage the reconciliation process and end the Palestinian division began with the assassination attempt on the Hamas leader, Director General of Internal Security Major General Tawfiq Abu Naim, followed by Israeli airstrikes on the Gaza Strip. In recent days, reactions to President Mahmoud Abbas's statements about recognizing Israel by members of the upcoming government and about the resistance weapons have poured more fuel on the smoldering fire to ignite it anew.
Before addressing the options available to the Palestinian political elite and the tactics I advise following at this stage, a quick review of the Palestinian political spectrum and its current political and organizational motivations with its three main components is necessary: the conservative side represented by Fatah, political Islam represented by Hamas, and the leftist democratic opposition represented by the Democratic and Popular Fronts, in addition to the People's Party and the Palestinian Initiative.
First, since the late President Martyr Yasser Arafat entered the homeland and formed the first Palestinian government until now, Fatah has failed to separate the organization from the parliamentary bloc... Fatah followed the destructive Eastern principle that the winner owns everything and the loser loses everything... From day one, it considered Palestine—land, people, and resources—as the organization's property, just as it dealt with the PLO from its inception. This principle not only harmed the Palestinian cause in general but also caused significant damage to the movement's structure, which lost thousands of its followers and tens of thousands of its supporters, leading to internal division. The movement became like a shopping mall containing shops run by men in the organization's first ranks, while the mall itself was managed by President Mahmoud Abbas... While all shop owners enjoyed political, organizational, and financial profit, the crisis was limited and contained but eventually exploded in several stages, leading to Fatah's loss in the 2006 elections, the expulsion of several organizational leaders, and the emergence of the reformist current ostracized by the president, led by Fatah member Mohammed Dahlan.
In addition to this deviation, the failure to separate the organization from the parliamentary bloc and the government came with the organization's full reliance on funds from Arab and Western supporters, which shackled the organization's hands from tactical movement and political maneuvering outside the rules and boundaries set by the external financier. The most important of these boundaries is the unconditional recognition of the occupation state, whose borders have not even been defined yet, making all matters, including the borders and sovereignty of the future Palestinian state, hostage to negotiations with the other party... The result is known to all and seen today on the ground: brutal settlement, an apartheid separation wall, and complete plundering of Palestine's natural resources. The other boundary set by the external financier is resistance of all kinds, especially armed resistance, which the financier considered terrorism and a threat to the occupation state. Security coordination, which President Mahmoud Abbas described as sacred, was established to curb resistance in all its forms. The result is also well known to all: daily raids on Authority areas, arbitrary arrests that do not spare even patients in Palestinian hospitals, and more than six hundred security checkpoints by the occupation to cut the Authority's areas apart and disrupt its internal security.
Fatah has lived for many years in a state of political loss and lack of direction. It addresses its masses as if it were a national liberation movement while dealing with the occupier and the external financier as if it were an independent state authority... This toxic cocktail has paralyzed the political and organizational movement's ability, and the concern of all its national members has become to get closer to the decision-making center within the movement to enjoy benefits and jobs; otherwise, they remain on the sidelines of events!
Second, since Hamas's participation in the last elections in 2006, it has been characterized by a failed reading of the political reality in Palestine and the region. Its erratic political behavior according to this reading led the movement to a dead end, forcing it ultimately to retreat from its Brotherhood project and return to the national fold. The movement also failed in its regional alliances after the military coup in Gaza and its attempt to build an emirate there, losing its two main allies, Syria and Iran, and falling between the waves of major politics and the intertwined interests of players. All this was a new field for the new Hamas player on the regional political stage, and the movement soon found itself between the hammer of Saudi Wahhabism and the anvil of the hegemonic Brotherhood interests of Turkey and Qatar...
After the coup in the Gaza Strip, Hamas tried to market itself globally as a moderate Islamic movement to break the siege, not through political rhetoric and alliances, but deliberately ignoring the growth of Salafi currents from Al-Qaeda to ISIS and planting their roots in the Strip. Later, the movement's security forces pursued them to show the world that it was moderate… This principle: if someone is on my right, I automatically become centrist without debate and no longer far right… This tactic cost Hamas and the Palestinian people dearly, as Salafi movements connected with their counterparts in Sinai, cooperated with them, and began to threaten Egyptian national security, prompting Egypt to close crossings and cut ties with the movement, which had been cordial for a long time. This measure, which harmed the interests of all sector residents, shook the movement's popularity in the Strip, reduced its support, and fragmented its masses and supporters… In addition, the failed policy of forcibly Islamizing society by various means deepened the rift between the movement and the masses. Hamas's rule in the Gaza Emirate was almost entirely unsuccessful except in maintaining internal security. The movement did not learn from the mistakes of past Palestinian movements, especially Fatah's errors, but rather adopted Fatah's governance principle: the winner takes all, and the loser gets nothing… Nepotism and blind loyalty quickly spread within the movement, exacerbating its crisis, which it managed to somewhat recover from for a very limited period after the two wars waged by the occupation on the Strip in recent years. However, the loss of allies and financiers due to the policy of balancing and political stock market tactics followed by the former political bureau chief Khaled Mashal worsened the movement's financial and political crisis.
Hamas has used and still uses the principle of the swing in its political rhetoric; the swing always moves to the peak of two directions, but these peaks weaken and fade over time because swinging drains energy… Thus, Hamas, in its oscillation in its mobilizing political rhetoric to the Palestinian masses and its external political discourse to the world, was always distinguished by a high rhetoric ceiling… It began its internal discourse with 'Islam is the solution' and 'Palestine is Islamic land' and no solution except the elimination of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state on historic Palestinian land… It gradually regressed over time, entered the Palestinian political system's whirlpool, called for a long-term truce with the occupation, then accepted in its new political document a Palestinian state within 1967 borders and retreated from its Muslim Brotherhood Salafi rhetoric. In its external political discourse, Hamas promoted the idea of the abode of peace and the abode of war and viewed the 'Crusader West' as the stronghold of the people of war and their danger to the Muslim nation, cooperating with global Zionism to control the world through international institutions like the United Nations. It moved from this historical fantasy to opening relations with this Crusader and even with the atheist Soviet communist, requesting assistance, accepting an active role for the UN and its institutions, and pragmatically dealing with UNRWA, a UN agency… This swinging in political presentation and this mixing of ideology and politics left the new pragmatic leadership of the movement a very heavy legacy that is difficult to overcome quickly.
Despite all this, Hamas remains the most dynamic Palestinian movement and the most embodying organizational and political renewal, which in itself opens a wide horizon for pragmatic engagement by the movement with all proposed issues.
Thirdly, the Palestinian left is the weakest link in the triangle of the Palestinian political structure, and this weakness is due to three main reasons, all purely internal:
The internal fragmentation of the factions themselves, especially in the Popular Front and the Democratic Front, and the general fragmentation among the left, which has not been able over a quarter of a century to agree on building a unified left front despite the near-complete alignment of the programs of these left factions. The organizational ossification in the structure of these factions and the overwhelming aging of their leadership made them distant from the pulse of the young dynamic street. The weakness of these factions' international relations and their inability to convey their political vision to international forums, remaining confined to a small political relations bubble dominated by political romanticism. I exclude here the Palestinian Initiative and its Secretary-General, who masters this game skillfully, few like him.
Since the beginning of confronting the Oslo project and its manifestations on the ground, the left began to decline, although it was the only current that had a comprehensive vision for confrontation, steadfastness, and the optimal solution… The reasons for this decline are many, and studying them suits a doctoral thesis more than a short article, but it must be noted here that this decline is directly linked to the three weaknesses mentioned above. The Palestinian left transformed from a party that proposed programs, alternatives, and solutions, as was the case after the 1973 war and the Democratic Front's proposal of the phased program, which was the main and perhaps the only lever for the rise of the Palestinian cause and its position in international politics, as well as proposing the national unity program after the Amman conference, passing through wise pragmatic leadership of the first Intifada, up to the declaration of independence in November 1988, into a pawn in the playground of Hamas and Fatah, tossed back and forth according to need… The left fell prey to the polarizations of the two major parties in the Palestinian arena and became forced to coexist with this polarization for fear of dissolution and disappearance… Today, I describe the Palestinian left as the 'current of statements and denunciations'! Despite the loss of the Islamist political current represented by Hamas and the traditional current represented by Fatah of any clear future vision for the Palestinian cause, the left did not dare to present a pragmatic, realistic political program for national salvation and was content with recycling past programs as if they were revealed scripture… Here it converges in mentality with religious currents in intellectual rigidity and static presentation.
The Palestinian situation stands at an important and historic crossroads, and its options at this stage are few and complex, requiring courage and complete internal cohesion. What is clear to everyone is that the tactic of 'standing still' no longer has a place in the Palestinian strategy, as this policy brings harm and loss to everyone—individuals, the people, and factions of all colors—and there is no other way to face this stage without full national unity based on the broad common denominator that benefits the cause and the people. Overcoming division to reach full reconciliation is a possible but lengthy path, and the experience of recent weeks has taught us lessons that must be taken into account if we want to reach the shore of safety on this path to cross the crossroads. The past weeks have also reaffirmed the importance of certain principles in Palestinian political work, which some have tried to ignore or bypass for personal goals and narrow visions:
Many are watching to sabotage the project to end the division, and they are strong—some external, some internal—and everyone must be cautious and avoid falling into the traps of the enemies of the cause. Therefore, I advise the three parties—Fatah, Hamas, and the left—to keep tight-lipped about all agreements and disagreements in the negotiation basements during this transitional phase and to stay away from the press and from showing off strength and heroism on social media... all of these are poisons in the body of negotiations that sour the atmosphere and open wide the doors to populism. The Palestinian people have no power to face the challenges of this stage except their will to determine their destiny, and this will is directly linked to the political and militant unity of the factions... consolidating unity and joint work increases the will and determination of the Palestinian people, who have repeatedly proven to be generous and capable of enduring hardships if their back is supported by systematic unity of the resistance factions and the political elite. No Palestinian party or movement alone can stand against the challenges of struggle and the requirements of political performance at this stage... past years have proven the failure of both Fatah and Hamas, each of which tried alone to carry out the task... the distant past experience proved that even partial, incomplete unity, as was during the first Intifada, was more successful and effective than unilateral action.
At this difficult stage, ideologies are an obstacle to developing a creative, offensive political performance... what is required is a pragmatic, realistic political discourse based on a joint work strategy agreed upon by all without forcing anyone to give up their ideological convictions. What is needed is to place strategy before ideology, not the other way around.
To cross the Palestinian political crossroads, overcoming division for unity is not enough, and even full national reconciliation will not suffice to enable the Palestinian situation to make a qualitative leap that restores its standing in regional and global politics... The fundamental dilemma lies in the dialectic of Palestinian political discourse and the struggle program that is supposed to be derived from the political program... The Palestinian struggle program, at least as we follow it through faction statements and their heroic tweets, does not match their political program nor their daily political performance. This imbalance has led to general alienation from politics in Palestine and a significant decline in struggle performance, if not its fading away.
The misunderstanding of this dialectic was observed in recent weeks and became clear through the criticism and responses directed at President Mahmoud Abbas regarding his statements on the conditions for recognizing Israel as a basis for participating in the upcoming government and his remarks about the armed struggle of the Palestinian factions. Therefore, I see at the end of this article the importance of offering another proposal on these two issues... My proposal is based on the principle of a constructive and beneficial common denominator for the national cause while preserving the ideological principles of all parties to reach a common Palestinian agreement based on a 'win-win' foundation that saves face for everyone and helps us later, after crossing the crossroads, to establish a new foundation for a political program and a struggle program that align with the requirements of the stage, noting that in any liberation movement, nothing is sacred except the goal... In the Palestinian case, the sacred is self-determination and building a state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital and a just solution to the refugee issue according to UN resolutions, primarily Resolution 194, and everything else is subject to modification and change according to the necessities of the stage!
Armed struggle; the transformation of the Palestinian armed struggle from a means of liberation and one of the mechanisms of struggle, which should originally be diverse, into an end in itself... This reality has emptied armed struggle of its content and placed it in the category of rigid ideology. Everyone, from left to right, chants the sanctity of armed struggle, and even thinking about the usefulness of this struggle method in some stages has become taboo and a red line that no one has the right to cross... Armed struggle has become a means of failure creation more than a struggle tool working to achieve a sacred goal, and it has become an internal competition tool among factions and is no longer primarily directed as a means of liberation.
In the struggle marches carried out by many peoples, many of them successfully, these marches passed through political changes and regional, global, and even internal alliances that were mostly imposed on the movement of struggle, and these movements chose their means of struggle according to the requirements of the stage... This is called pragmatic constructive struggle that only puts the goal in front of it and does everything to achieve it... In the Palestinian case, many things changed, circumstances flipped, allies changed, fronts changed, capabilities diversified, and even the contact lines with the enemy, some of which changed and some disappeared, but the Palestinian factional leaderships kept in their populist rhetoric armed struggle as the most important means of struggle, if not the only one... This ideological rigidity does not stem from a firm conviction in the possibility of complete or partial military overcoming of the enemy but from a tactic that sees armed struggle as an opiate that numbs the people to divert their attention from the leaders' failures in their political hands.
Despite all this, at this stage we must respect everyone's position on this point and their sensitivity to it, and we must find a middle ground that combines the president's stance and his rejection of armed action, the opposing stance of Hamas which sees armed struggle as the only means of liberation, and between them the position of the Palestinian left that wants to unify efforts and capabilities in this field in a joint operations room for resistance factions... I propose that the security arms of all factions be transformed into Popular Protection Committees in all locations. These committees do not directly follow the Palestinian security apparatuses managed directly by the government but are subject to its laws and do not conflict with them in their approach. Also, these committees manage their affairs independently, away from the political agenda of the Palestinian factions... The importance of this step lies in ending destructive competition in this field and correcting the course of this means, which no longer serves as an offensive tool but becomes a means of defense for the people against settler gangs and attacks by the occupation army.
Recognition of Israel: The fundamental dilemma in the Palestinian political discourse lies in the lack of credibility of the discourse... Everyone in the Palestinian political arena, except the People's Party, the Initiative, and sometimes the Democratic Front, speaks with two tongues: one addresses its members and supporters with a mostly mobilizing populist discourse that puts ideology before strategy and paints a struggle fantasy for the masses only, and the other tongue addresses the world, states, and international institutions with the two-state solution and peaceful coexistence with good neighborliness... This dance on the feelings of the masses has become an obstacle to the development of an offensive Palestinian political discourse amid the acceleration of the occupier's political system towards the right and the far right... Our weakness is one of the most important levers they hold against the occupier... Getting out of this vortex is possible by changing the rules of the Palestinian political game and the fields of work and responsibility of the two main institutions of the Palestinian political entity, the PLO and the Palestinian Authority.
First, it is not required of the Palestinian factions individually to recognize the occupation state for several reasons:
There is no international law that imposes this matter... Recognition occurs between states or what is agreed to be called a 'state in formation.' There are parties participating in the Israeli government, which is now the majority in the government, that do not even recognize the existence of the Palestinian people as a people with the right to self-determination, let alone recognizing Palestine as a state. The PLO recognized Israel and is, as President Mahmoud Abbas and all the factions of the organization know it, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO also enjoys this recognition from international institutions... and it is, as treated by the international community, the political legitimacy of the Palestinian people wherever they are. The Palestinian Authority, as stated in the agreement that created it, the Oslo Agreement, is an authority to manage the affairs of the Palestinian people in the transitional phase... It is not a substitute for the PLO or its legitimacy in representing the Palestinian people... The Authority does not have the right to recognize or withdraw recognition of Israel, so the president's demand came from the parties that want to participate in the government to recognize Israel first, without motive or justification.
In these points lies the solution to get out of the dilemma... The Palestinian factions must agree that the external political affairs, with all their details including negotiations with Israel and external representation, are the task of the PLO only, and this is an exit for both Hamas and the president. The Palestinian government inside manages the daily affairs of the people, including internal security and services, and is not bound by the external political decision of the organization. Here, it is possible to address separating the presidency of the Authority from the presidency of the organization so that political confusions do not occur as has been the case since 1994 until now.
