Citizenship in our East remains a rare magical word and still a wish difficult to achieve, if not impossible to reach under these political atmospheres and this type of political elite. The relationship between the political elite in the Arab East and the citizen is one of follower and followed, of superior and inferior, and in some places, we can be frank with ourselves and speak of a master and servant relationship.
The political elite do not treat the citizen as an equal but see him as a tool to be used whenever they wish, and when needed, they bring him to the arena of national work to achieve goals that primarily serve the interests of the elite.
The relationship in the East between the ruler and the ruled is a superior, arrogant one, far from being like that in secular, civilized democratic societies. In these societies, the political elite see the citizen as the most important part of society, which is why they hasten and exert great efforts to win his favor by involving him in decision-making and national direction. Political elites compete among themselves to gain the citizen’s and civil institutions’ approval to obtain support and trust for themselves and their political and social programs. You see them working hand in hand with civil society forces, sharing common interests, and the elites try to involve these forces in decision-making, seek their help in various fields, and take their opinions into account in important aspects of political and social life.
In contrast, we are in the East. Here, the citizen runs and struggles to win the favor and approval of the political elite.
The citizen in the East is divided in his dealings with the political elite and its apparatus into three categories: either he fears the political elite and avoids them to protect himself personally or his family and business, or he despises and envies them, considering them alien to society and untrustworthy with the nation's and people's wealth and interests due to their detachment from the reality of society and the ordinary citizen, or he is indifferent to the situation because he is tired of bridging the gap between himself and the political elite and implicitly believes that his world and the world of the political elite run on parallel tracks with no partnership between them.
Occupied Palestine is at the heart of the Arab East, and here I do not mean only politically or geographically but also realistically. The relationship between the political elite and the citizen does not differ at all from that in the Eastern countries. In fact, this relationship takes a particularly dramatic turn because Palestine is occupied and the citizen naturally assumes, rightly so, that the political elite must first lead the movement to liberate the homeland and act differently from their brothers in the East, seeing the citizen and civil society institutions as the main support for their political struggle and the backbone of the fight to achieve national rights.
The reality in the Palestinian case does not differ at all from the situation in the broader Arab East; the degree of citizenship is determined by your proximity or distance as an ordinary citizen from the ruling elite or your affiliation with the ruling party or family.
In occupied Palestine, a hateful, harmful, and destructive competitive relationship prevails between the political elite and civil society institutions. The political elite see civil society institutions and their mass activism as a constant threat to their interests and the biggest obstacle to consolidating and continuing their authority. Civil society institutions, in turn, see the political elite as the main barrier to taking their role in developing society and genuinely participating in shaping the program for liberation from occupation and building democratic secular state institutions. Not only that, but in Palestine, the political elite deal with civil society institutions, when necessary, as a tool to fight other political parties through various steps and means.
The political elites, especially the dominant ones, become creative in exploiting and using civil society institutions to achieve their authoritarian goals.
In the diaspora, especially in those inhabited by a large number of Palestinians such as Europe, the strained relationship between the majority of the Palestinian political elite and the Palestinian civil society institutions operating in the European arena is evident to all. From our political work and involvement with civil society institutions in the European arena for more than two decades, we can classify the political elite's dealings with civil society institutions into four types:
* Those elites who see civil society institutions, including associations, mass unions, and friendship societies, merely as a means and tool to consolidate their political influence among the Palestinian people in the diaspora and as a supporting lever to increase their representatives and power in Palestinian decision-making institutions (PLO, Palestinian Authority, etc.). Whenever the opportunity arises to gain influence and dominance without civil society institutions, they abandon the latter, and not only that, but they also fight them by all means and, if necessary, work to dissolve them under cheap slogans. This happened after the Oslo Accords; at that time, instructions and decrees were issued from the highest echelons of the Palestinian leadership to dismantle the mass unions that were the backbone of the Palestinian national work in the diaspora. This decision came after its owners were convinced that the PLO was put in the basement and the National Council was hypnotized for a long time after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, thus there was no longer a need for mass institutions that stood as an obstacle to the new Palestinian political project nor a need for their representatives in the National Council.
* The second group of political elites deals with civil society institutions with dignity and respect. Their relationship with civil society and its institutions is modern, based on modernity and the conviction of complementarity between the two parties rather than conflict. This category of the political elite understands the correct dialectic based on the fact that the space occupied by civil society institutions in fieldwork generally brings good to the national situation and political contribution for all. This group is the one that saved the Palestinian national situation in Europe from collapse by building community unions after the popular unions were aborted by the first group.
* The third group of the political elite hides behind civil society institutions to cover their political work on one hand, and on the other hand, they rapidly build parallel civil society institutions to those built by the Palestinian political elites affiliated with the PLO. This is not by chance but because they work within a studied program to present themselves as an alternative to the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people. Strangely, the Palestinian national political elite deals with this group calmly and deliberately overlooks their divisive work.
* The fourth group, although it was among the initiators of establishing Palestinian communities in European cities after the abortion of the Palestinian mass unions by the first group, as we elaborated, has started to retreat from its advanced position over the years and has now become among those with a 'non-position.' From time to time, this group subtly antagonizes the other three groups of political elites, which has marginalized it from collective work.
Recent events in the European arena, specifically in Germany, confirm the accuracy of what we have read about the reality of the strained relationship between the Palestinian political elite and the Palestinian civil society institutions. Since the collapse of what was falsely called 'peace talks,' witnessed by those who wielded its sword and clung to it, the Palestinian body has been torn politically, geographically, and socially.
Initially, the first category of the Palestinian political elite returned to attempts to revive the popular unions, knowing that the deadlock of the Palestinian Authority has only one way out, which is to revive the PLO and bring it out of the basement where it has been buried since 1993. They are convinced that this return will not be complete without convening the National Council, which also includes members from the popular unions, as they were the sole representatives of civil society before the establishment of diaspora institutions, right of return institutions, institutions preserving national identity, and solidarity institutions with our steadfast people in occupied Palestine. It was necessary to revive them to bestow legitimacy on the representatives of these defunct unions in the Palestinian National Council. This step came after persistent attempts over the past two decades to abort the Palestinian diaspora institutions by either fighting them or through failed attempts to build parallel diaspora frameworks affiliated with the first category of the political elite. The response of the second and fourth categories to this attempt to revive the popular unions is conclusive evidence of the deep rift between the broader Palestinian political elite and the broader Palestinian civil society institutions in the diaspora. The correct step should have been to build specialized institutions for engineers, doctors, women, students, etc., from within the diaspora institution to strengthen it and correct the mistake made by some of these elites in misreading the new reality of the Palestinian diaspora. Reviving nebulous institutions like the popular unions with their outdated structure is a step backward and another proof of the real developmental crisis that has afflicted Palestinian political work since the signing of the Oslo surrender agreements. The fabricated election results of these unions and the low turnout of diaspora members to join their ranks is further proof of the divergence of the political and social paths of the national movement from each other.
The second incident that reveals the extent to which some Palestinian political factions in the diaspora have lost their operational compass was the boycott by the first, third, and fourth categories of the major national event in Berlin a week ago, called the “First Palestinian Diaspora Conference.” In a previous article, I shed light on this boycott and its paradoxes and will not repeat it now, but the great success of the conference despite failed sabotage and insults by some using means alien to national work, such as impersonating names and phone numbers to send obscene messages to everyone to sow discord between the event organizers and attempts by some participants to exclude the PLO’s name from the final statement in response to sabotage and boycott attempts by some PLO factions, which were successfully confronted by those who participated and insisted on the exclusive representation of the PLO for the entire Palestinian people, confirmed the crisis the Palestinian situation is experiencing.
It is time to sit at the round table to end the tyranny and chaos surrounding the Palestinian cause and national work in the diaspora. National work is not exclusive to any faction or party. Unity on Palestinian constants under the umbrella of the PLO is the only safety valve for all Palestinians. Our strength lies in our true national unity based on mutual respect and joint work between civil society institutions and political elites, and our weakness and limited contribution to supporting our brave people’s intifada has one single lever... unity of ranks and striking with the sword of the steadfast people and their valiant uprising.
