The mountain labored and gave birth to a mouse....
Hamas, its new document and expulsion from Qatar
Arab media published in early May the content of the new political document of the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine “Hamas.” It sparked a lively debate among supporters and remnants of its opponents, between both sides, opponents and supporters alike.
This was expected after about thirty years since the issuance of Hamas’s first charter and the scarcity, indeed absence, of intellectual contribution that accompanied the movement since its inception until now.
The evaluation was divided between describing the new document as Hamas’s pragmatic political attack and conclusive proof of its political realism and ability to deal with changes objectively and with high national sense, and those who described the document as a retreat from principles, denial of origin, and joining the Palestinian national movement represented by the factions of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and those who said the document brought no new policy and would bear no fruit.
In this article, I will not repeat what was said in the analysis of both supporters and opponents regarding the document’s 42 clauses, not due to their lack of importance but because the content of the document is more of a general orientation than the expected and required details after all this time and the fragmentation, division, and marginalization of the Palestinian cause as the main issue in the Middle East.
All clauses of the document had been expressed and published by Hamas’s leadership, especially its political bureau and former head Khaled Mashal in many political statements and media interviews.
Anyone following Hamas’s political work over the past thirty years must reach such a conviction or more. Hence, my surprise and astonishment at what the former head of Hamas’s political bureau said about the document and the effort spent preparing it, stating that preparation began in 2013 and lasted four full years, including two years of legal consultation and expert review.
What matters in this article is clarifying and analyzing the way this document was produced, its publication timing, and its strategic relationship with Hamas’s charter and what Hamas’s leadership wanted to achieve through this document.
Now, after four weeks of its publication, Hamas is reaping its fruits. The fruits are not only sweet but also bitter like gall, and the harvest is not only wheat but also tares and various impurities.
First, it is essential to note some basics in Hamas’s discourse and before it the discourse of the mother organization; the Muslim Brotherhood and all Islamist political movements that emerged like mushrooms since the 1920s.
Firstly: Political Islam, including Hamas, deliberately drops the historical dimension of events and detaches them from their historical context. This was their reading of the Quran as done by Sayyid Qutb, Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi before him, and their sheikhs and leaders.
They dropped the historical dimension of the text, denied the existence of Quranic stories, and gravely harmed the noble religion. We in the East are now reaping the fruits of this harm through Islamist terrorist movements that rely on their incomplete reading and interpretation of the divine text. Hamas has usurped Palestinian history since its establishment until now, as shown by their appropriation of the name and history of the first revolutionary leader Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam and others, while from day one it has mocked Palestinian factions for some of their political stances forced by historical necessity and the political reality at the time of those positions and programs.
Secondly: Hamas and all Islamist political movements harm the glorious Arab history by continuously promoting an incomplete and truncated civilization, as if Arab history, glory, and civilization began in the sixth century with the Prophet Muhammad’s emergence. They deliberately ignore the ancient Arab civilization before Islam and the seeds of civilization planted by non-Muslims that grew and flourished, and the cultural contributions of these non-Muslims to Arab civilization from its inception until today, whose contributions remain a shining star in Arab civilization.
They, Hamas and various Islamist political movements, try to hide the sun’s rays with a sieve, as the Arab agricultural proverb says, and unfortunately, they have succeeded in planting their truncated reading of Arab civilization history in the minds of tens of millions in the Arab and Islamic worlds.
Hamas portrays in its literature as if the Palestinian revolution and resistance against occupation began with Hamas’s establishment and charter, and that previous struggle was futile and incomplete until Hamas appeared and published its charter. They deliberately forgot that they refrained from fighting the occupation from its beginning until the first Intifada in December 1987. Not only that, but they were hostile to Palestinian resistance factions, inciting and mocking their struggle against occupation with a society whose Islam was not fully formed as they claimed.
Hamas and all Islamist political movements must realize a universal scientific truth: you can falsify or interpret a political statement as you wish to suit your political desire, but you cannot falsify the nation’s and people’s history, which is witnessed by hundreds of millions and countless research and books.
Returning to the charter and the document and their analysis.
In my assessment, Hamas’s new document is neither a continuation nor clarification of the charter as some claim.
The document is Hamas’s first political program and the first document clarifying the movement’s political orientations, differing from the charter in goal, orientation, audience, and reason for issuance.
The charter issued in August 1988, in my opinion, is Hamas’s ideological program and far from being a political program.
The charter is what is called a political science “Manifest.” It came as a religious, ideological sermon in which Hamas defined its ideological identity and affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood and its evaluation of the conflict with the occupation as a religious conflict, not a colonial or imperialist one, distinguishing it from the consensus Palestinian national discourse based on which the PLO was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It prioritizes ideological identity by defining itself first as an Islamic movement, second Arab, and finally Palestinian, which is conclusive evidence of its ideological priorities, orientations, affiliations, and commitments.
Here, fairness requires noting that Hamas was entirely sincere in the past thirty years regarding its strategic priorities and political work.
These priorities and strong ideological foundation became clear during the so-called Arab Spring and its deviation from its old path and tactical alliances it tried to present as its true ideological alliances in the years preceding the Arab Spring.
At the start of the Muslim Brotherhood’s harvest in Tunisia and Egypt, the fruits of the youth and people’s revolution were diverted from their course to serve the Brotherhood’s project aligned with Turkey’s Brotherhood and its Gulf allies and Western supporters. Hamas dropped its mask, revealed its true face, and aligned with the ideological camp it identified with in the charter, returning to its origin after years of camouflage.
Since its inception about thirty years ago, Hamas has tried to present itself as an alternative to the PLO, not a complement, despite the political flirtation in the charter which Hamas repeated and mastered presenting to disguise its hidden intentions through various political statements.
Hamas tried twice to present itself as an alternative leadership for the Palestinian people and heir to the PLO. The first time was after the Oslo Accords signing during a meeting of the Palestinian forces’ Decade Alliance opposing Oslo held in Damascus, where the Palestinian left, led by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, confronted it. The second time was in a press statement by former political bureau chief Khaled Mashal in Doha.
Hamas still dances on a clear political strategy rope aiming to lead the Palestinian people, which is a legitimate right for any Palestinian movement or party. The rejected aspect is not the strategy itself but the tactics Hamas uses, which exposed the Palestinian national project to great danger, resulting in the disastrous division that the Palestinian people have paid dearly for over seven years.
After failed attempts to bypass and abort the PLO with regional and Arab forces’ cooperation, Hamas returned to the tactic of undermining the Palestinian national movement’s institutions from within. It prepared for this tactic with many statements starting with demanding PLO entry under unrealistic conditions far from reality and ending with calls to reform PLO institutions and elect the Palestinian National Council members directly without clear election mechanisms, opposing the Palestinian left’s proposals for comprehensive elections for all Palestinian institutions under a fully proportional and more democratic law better meeting the Palestinian people’s need for unity to face great challenges.
Hamas began preparing its new political program called the document, as stated by many of its leaders, years ago, after its coup against its main allies Iran and Syria and its move into the mother organization, the Brotherhood, led by Turkey and Qatar. The document clearly reflects these two countries’ policies toward Israel, with which they maintain strong economic, military, and political relations.
Hamas’s leadership mostly responded to Qatari and Turkish pressure, moving from political flirtation to a clear political program. Hamas acted according to the old agricultural proverb: “He who eats the ruler’s bread must strike with his sword.”
The political points in Hamas’s document, considered by some colleagues a major shake, had been expressed by its leadership represented by Khaled Mashal on several occasions but it was difficult to compile them into a clear, integrated program for fear of internal opposition led by Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar, supported by most of Hamas’s military wing in Gaza, and fear of division within the movement, which repeatedly appeared especially after the Gaza coup and changes in the movement’s regional alliances.
Now, after handing over all its political cards to its allies in Qatar and Turkey and with the near impossibility of division under current regional and Palestinian internal conditions, Hamas’s leadership presented this document.
The document does not contradict the PLO’s program on any essential point, which Hamas intended so as not to sever ties with Palestinian legitimacy, allowing it, if the Brotherhood’s project in the Middle East fails completely, to return to demanding entry into the PLO and attempt to undermine it from within.
Hamas realizes the critical crisis the PLO has reached, the deliberate marginalization of its institutions by the dominating party, the overlap of authority institutions with it, and the strategic loss the Palestinian situation suffers, aiming to appear ultimately as the savior of the Palestinian case from fragmentation and division.
Revealing the document days before Ismail Haniyeh’s election as Hamas’s political bureau chief, succeeding Khaled Mashal, was also intentional. Hamas’s leadership did not want to appear as if the new political leadership of Haniyeh and al-Sinwar started a new phase of realistic politics after taking over but rather bound the new leadership with a political program agreed upon in the Muslim Brotherhood’s global Shura Council and with Qatar and Turkey’s approval and blessing.
Hamas’s leadership did not want to leave the Muslim Brotherhood’s shadow, as Tunisia’s Ennahda Movement led by Ghannouchi did, keeping the final decisive decisions on critical matters in the global Brotherhood Shura Council’s hands, as it did when issuing its charter in 1988, deciding to participate in the Palestinian Authority elections in 1996, and deciding on the Gaza coup in 2006.
Hamas misread the regional and global political map as it did previously. It believed that with its new political program and amid the emergence of a renewed Middle East with two clear poles: the resistance led by Iran and Syria and the so-called “moderation” led by Turkey and Saudi Arabia with clear Israeli-American support, it could present itself as the pragmatic Palestinian side capable of making and implementing decisions to reach a solution with Israel.
Hamas’s gratuitous concessions, starting by putting all its eggs in Qatar and Turkey’s basket under Saudi guardianship, reaped bitter gall fruits by being listed as a terrorist organization and having some of its leaders expelled from Qatar.
Hamas ended up empty-handed, and after thirty years, the clear conclusion is that the mountain labored and gave birth to a mouse.
In conclusion, contrary to what most colleagues have presented, I assert that Hamas did not make a strategic leap nor a qualitative ideological transformation but rather a tactical shift that quickly backfired, and it now stands before the shards of its political recklessness and rope-dancing.
