The step taken by President Mahmoud Abbas to freeze allocations to the Popular Front and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine from the Palestinian National Fund was not a new step. The whip of political money is as old as the Palestinian national struggle. Repeatedly, this weapon has been used by the dominant faction in the Palestinian context to buy loyalties or punish individuals and movements inside and outside PLO institutions. The positive aspect of this step is the renewed focus on the Palestinian National Fund, whose budget is estimated at several billions and is managed by a small handful of Palestinian figures far from any oversight or accountability. Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, this fund has disappeared from Palestinian reality and discourse.
The novelty lies in the timing and context chosen for this step. The fronts' statement that this step came “as punishment” for their positions against Mahmoud Abbas’s policies is a statement for public consumption and does not clarify the facts, even if it initially seems accurate.
The two fronts have been, and still are, albeit unevenly, at the forefront of the Palestinian camp opposing the Oslo Accords and all their implications, including security coordination and full economic ties with the Zionist state. They remain the backbone of opposition within the PLO and the Palestinian Authority. The parties’ stances on broad lines to develop Palestinian political performance and resistance against occupation have not changed in the last two decades. Thus, the motivation for this unpatriotic step by President Mahmoud Abbas stems from another source, and the response to this disgraceful act must be more than timid condemnation and demands to “lift sanctions” on the fronts. Although this demand is justified, it is no longer sufficient nor does it appease the anger of the parties’ supporters and the overwhelming majority of our people, including members of Fatah, who are tired of this poor political performance from the president’s inner circle and the monopolization of decisions away from the people’s institutions and their frameworks.
The Palestinian situation, after more than eight years of division and the embrace of both Fatah in the presidency and Hamas by external forces working hard with all their material and diplomatic means to abort the Palestinian cause, is very critical. This situation, quietly unfolding in regional and global diplomatic backrooms, requires a new struggle strategy from the Palestinian democratic left. A strategy based on ending fragmentation within the Palestinian left and beginning to form a broad national democratic front against the monopolization by both sides of the division, presenting the left as a real national alternative to lead the liberation march and affirm Palestinian national constants and the unifying identity of the entire Palestinian people represented in the PLO.
The Palestinian cause and the Palestinian-Zionist conflict have always been the central link in the region, clearly reflected in the intense diplomatic activity by key regional actors to tame the dominant parties in the Palestinian arena to accept a “reasonable” solution with the Zionist entity that preserves the narrow personal and factional interests of the divided parties and allows them to return to the center of regional events after losing their bets that began with the so-called Arab Spring.
With the anticipated beginning of the end of the Syrian situation and the Saudi war on Yemen, finding a solution to the Palestinian cause has become a priority for forces betting on their position in the region after losing and retreating in their destructive Brotherhood project for the East, losing complete control over the region. The Palestinian cause is now the only bridge ensuring these forces’ entry into the new Middle East equation. This new Middle East is taking shape clearly within the new global order and the end of American-Western monopoly on international politics, revealed by the Ukrainian war and concluded with direct Russian intervention in Syria and Western acceptance of Russia as a global power that cannot be ignored in resolving central global conflicts. The new Middle East continued to crystallize with the signing of the Iranian nuclear file and the conviction of the United States and its Western and regional allies that Iran is the foremost regional player that cannot be bypassed in any regional settlement from now on.
The new Middle East is divided into two antagonistic camps: the resistance camp including Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Hezbollah, and the authoritarian camp including Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Between these camps are Middle Eastern countries that occasionally align with the resistance camp, such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Kuwait, and others cautiously approaching the authoritarian camp, like Egypt.
In the midst of this polarization and alignment among regional powers, the Ramallah Authority found itself in Saudi Arabia’s embrace, and Gaza’s authority fell into the arms of Turkey and Qatar, while the Palestinian left wavered and has not yet made a decision. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the primary ally of leftist forces, the Palestinian left has fallen into the trap of “neutrality and balanced stance.” This strategy was somewhat effective and necessary in the late twentieth century but has now become, given the new regional structure and strategic global alliances, the main reason for the decline of these Palestinian forces, which still live in the era of ideologies, even though we are in the East in general and the Palestinian case in particular in the post-ideological era. Amid this confusion between ideological and pragmatic approaches, forces and factions within the Palestinian left have grown that tried to adapt to the Palestinian situation, positioning themselves in initial sites and becoming a barrier to the left’s development and its taking of decisive decisions regarding its future as a party and national movement and the future of the national cause in general.
The Palestinian left must decisively resolve two basic positions if it truly wants to emerge from the slow melting pot:
First, it must conduct a “cleansing” within its ranks of figures who have aligned with the Ramallah Authority and become closer to it, distancing themselves from many positions of their movements’ policies and becoming a strong deterrent to the left taking its role as an effective opposition with a liberating struggle program alternative to the policies shaped by the president’s inner circle for years. It must also rid itself of the dependency some leftist figures have built on Gaza’s authority, which has paralyzed all opposition national work capabilities in the sector. The left in Gaza has become merely a group of charitable associations awaiting crumbs from external forces.
Second, the Palestinian left must clarify its position in the new Middle Eastern structure. As in nature, there is no void, and in politics, there is no vacuum... Either it is in the authoritarian alliance following Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as both the Ramallah and Gaza authorities have done, or it aligns with those who still raise the Palestinian flag and the banner of liberation and reject Brotherhood hegemony on the ground and its peoples. Neutrality means extinction.
What is being plotted in diplomatic backrooms now, expected to surface in the coming months, is a program for the complete abortion of the Palestinian dream to establish its state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital and to limit the influence of the resistance alliance.
European and regional powers, working with direct support and pressure from the American administration, are trying to convince Israel and the authorities in Ramallah and Gaza to accept a new settlement project including the following steps: Israel verbally recognizes and accepts the Arab Peace Initiative, after which open-ended talks begin to implement practical steps on the ground. The first step is symbolic Israeli recognition of the Palestinians’ right to establish an independent state within the 1967 borders, starting work on solidifying this state’s features in Gaza and a wide self-rule linked to Gaza within areas (A), limited return of a few thousand refugees to historic Palestine lands, and establishing an international fund to compensate the rest of the refugees after their preliminary acceptance to waive their rights. This is followed by direct geographic expansion of Jerusalem accepted internationally so that Israel can later “cede” a part officially and protocol-wise called “East Jerusalem” for the Palestinian Authority to adopt as its symbolic capital.
In the talks, which will last years, two important matters will be discussed: first, refugee compensation methods, and second, land swap mechanisms between Palestine and Israel, where the Sinai project will reemerge. This project envisions Palestine renting from Egypt a Sinai area for 99 years, roughly twice the size of Gaza, where large cities will be built to accommodate hundreds of thousands of refugees coming from abroad who received private compensation for their properties in Palestine.
The residents there will rely on tourism and services, while Palestine relinquishes areas in the West Bank to Israeli settlements, especially those currently in area (C). The Turkish-Saudi alliance, with help from Qatar and Egypt, is working hard to reconcile views between Ramallah and Gaza. The so-called reconciliation meeting in Saudi Arabia was one such step, followed by shuttle visits of Hamas delegations to Qatar and Turkey and then visits by President Mahmoud Abbas to Europe and some Arab countries. Abbas’s alignment with the Saudi alliance in its aggressive war on Yemen and joining the fierce Saudi campaign against Hezbollah under the name “Islamic Alliance to Combat Terrorism” and Hamas’s silence on all this... all these steps can be understood from the perspective of “paying the bill.” Cutting the two fronts’ allocations from the Palestinian National Fund cannot be understood outside this general context and new regional alignments... The question that arises is: Where is the Palestinian democratic left in all this? What does its timid response to all regional events that directly affect the Palestinian situation and the homeland’s fate mean?
The Palestinian left’s response to this strategy and these regional developments will essentially determine the fate of a large part of these movements.
