The Crisis of the Palestinian Left

I am certain that no two people disagree that the Palestinian situation has been in a real, complex, and compounded crisis for many years. A crisis of authority and strategy, a financial crisis, an internal and external crisis, a PLO crisis, and a crisis of its existence and institutions, in addition to crises in all matters related to political contribution, political structure, and the Palestinian socio-political fabric. The one responsible for this miserable situation is not only the occupation and the global and regional forces supporting it, as claimed by the two Palestinian authorities in Ramallah and Gaza and their affiliates who try to deceive the public, nor only the party dominating the Palestinian situation since the start of the Palestinian struggle in 1965 as claimed by the Palestinian left, nor solely the political Islam that has yet to define the priority of its national Palestinian agenda as we have written and analyzed. The one responsible, and in my opinion primarily responsible, is also the Palestinian democratic left represented by the Democratic Front, the Popular Front, and the Palestinian People's Party. These three movements have not yet decided what they want from their engagement in internal Palestinian political work and have remained, since the 1970s until now, decorative parties that have never seriously or truly considered seizing power and competing sincerely to lead the people and the cause. The three groups have remained political movements dealing with minor issues, allowing the two dominant parties in the Palestinian situation since at least the early 1990s to manipulate them as they please. Sometimes they flirt with Fatah al-Democratic, sometimes with the Popular Front and the People's Party, wrapping themselves in the name of fake national unity, and sometimes we observe childish political infatuations between Hamas and the Popular Front under the banner of unity in the confrontation front. These flirtations and rapprochements are nothing but maneuvers to strike the internal opponent or internal competition among the democratic left parties themselves to gain some privileges here or there. This record and this relationship among the colors of the Palestinian political spectrum is not strange but undoubtedly an open and legitimate political battle between Fatah and Hamas to win over the three democratic parties and pull them to their side and strengthen themselves against the internal political opponent.

The question is not what traps Fatah and Hamas set for the democratic left forces; this is a legitimate democratic game as I mentioned, although sometimes, especially in the current Palestinian case, it is political nonsense not necessarily serving the supreme national interest. The more correct and appropriate question is: can each of the democratic left forces individually face the political maneuvers of the two Palestinian authoritarian sides, Fatah and Hamas? And the second question I pose to the democratic left forces is: when will you realize that the Palestinian people yearn for an alternative to the two parties of political bankruptcy and that it is your national duty to present this alternative that you have long praised in your documents, analyses, programs, and appeals... and there are many!

The answer to my questions, unfortunately, is clear and proven by the past and present day after day. The Palestinian democratic left parties have become meteors in the Palestinian political orbit without a specific goal, and if they do not unite within a unified front framework to become a shining star leading the Palestinian struggle after the catastrophic failure of the two authoritarian sides, their fate will be near-total burning out, and I do not exclude extinction and dissolution as well.

The three main parties of the Palestinian democratic left, despite slight ideological differences among them, have a strategic line, daily political discourse, and vision for the future of Palestine as land, entity, and people that hardly differ from each other. There is a difference in methods of struggle against the occupation among the democratic left parties, but the goal of the struggle is one. There is almost complete agreement on the structure of the future Palestinian society after the occupation is expelled and complete agreement on the type of governance in free Palestine, its features, and its regional and global relations.

In brief, I, and I believe I am not alone, do not know the reason for the lack of unity among the three Palestinian left parties? And if full institutional and membership unity is currently impossible, what is the obstacle to a unified front political work that presents the Palestinian democratic left as an alternative to the parties of national loss? Is it really the narrow interests, visions, and personal ambitions of some influential figures in the three parties? Or is it the pervasive fear among the three currents of each other and the lack of trust among the leaderships of the organizations? Whatever the reasons for the lack of unity of the Palestinian democratic left, the result is one: a first-degree national loss paid for by the struggling people, and the responsibility is borne not only by the leaderships of the democratic left but also by their bases that have not yet risen against their aging leaderships to force unity for the sake of the homeland, the cause, and a better future for Palestine as a people, land, and cause.

The Palestinian left, despite its strong relations with global leftist liberation movements, has not learned much from its friends in Latin America, nor from its friends in South Africa, nor from its friends in Greece and Spain. The Palestinian left is fighting a battle of self-extinction without realizing that this is also the extinction of the entire national cause.